I. Introduction
As research on rural credit in Europe has developed over the last fifteen years, one area of the subject that has proved particularly important is the relationship between credit and the transfer of land. Several studies have emphasized that it is now inadequate simply to regard the sale of land by an indebted peasant as the only significant way in which the movement of credit and of land interacted in the preindustrial period. Instead, it is clear that a surprisingly wide range of land transactions performed a variety of subtly differing functions in facilitating the provision or repayment of credit in the countryside (Béaur, 1994; Poulsen, 2004; Furió and Mira Jodar, 2005) . It could plausibly be argued that it is no longer possible to study the land market of any European region properly without simultaneously exploring local credit networks, since the two areas were evidently so closely interrelated. Equally, a crucial objective of the study of any set of credit transactions must be to discover how far those transactions were motivated by the acquisition of medieval society's most prized resource.
In 1970, in a formative contribution to the study of the peasant land market of medieval England, Hyams reflected upon the options open to an indvidual who, around 1200, 'had in some sense the disposal of land but was in need of cash'. He sketched a variety of scenarios through which the hypothetical peasant might have used his land to raise credit, or to generate the liquidity with which to discharge existing obligations (Hyams, 1970: 30-1) . For many years after the publication of Hyams's article, however, little attempt was made to trace such scenarios in the available evidence. Furthermore, research on the land market of medieval England reached a mature stage in the mid-1980s, some years before work on credit on rural credit began in earnest (Dyer, 2005) . As such, even when land market studies were at their most popular, the possibility that aspects of that market were explicable with respect to credit networks was considered only in general terms. More recently, however, work on England has followed Continental European research in recognizing the need to study land market and credit market in tandem (Schofield, 2004; Schofield, forthcoming) .
The focus in what follows is on the land and credit transactions of England's peasant tenants. The land they held from their lords in this period divides into two main categories, freehold land and customary land, the latter being also known as servile or villein land. To date, consideration of the links between peasant land and credit networks has been concerned almost exclusively with the tenants of customary land (villeins). This largely reflects the fact that the control exercised by landlords over their customary tenancies was much more intense than that applied to the free holdings, with the result that the villeins are better documented than the free tenants.
In the present context, a key aspect of this contrast between customary land and free land was that all changes in the tenancy of customary land had to be reported to the lord's manor court, and take place via the lord rather than directly from old tenant to new tenant. Thus the pre-eminent source for the peasant land market is the manorial court roll, in which all transfers of customary land were recorded (Smith, 1984; Harvey, 1984) . The manor court also generated the best souce for rural credit before 1350, which is the inter-peasant debt litigation heard by many such courts and recorded upon their rolls. Attention has thus naturally focused on the betterdocumented villeins, whose land transactions and debt disputes are often detailed side by side in the court rolls.
Although it remains at an early stage, work on the associations between land transfer and credit relationships among customary tenants has identified three key areas. The first is the sale of land in order to repay debts. The second is the use of credit structures to facilitate the purchase of land. The third and final area is the use of land as security in order to raise credit. Research to date suggests that the most important of these was the first, the alienation of land by people already indebted as a means of generating liquidity. Somewhat scantier evidence has been found to date of the second kind of association, that is, of individuals who used credit to acquire new parcels of land, either by borrowing money from a third party to pay the purchase price or entry fine, or by agreeing with the vendor to pay the purchase price in installments. The weakest type of association of the three appears to be the employment of existing landholdings to raise further credit. Full mortgages of customary land are very rare, and relatively few of the short-term inter-peasant leases of customary land noted in court rolls have attributes that indicate that they functioned as 'gages' of land, in which a loan was given in return for the lease (Briggs, forthcoming: Chapter 3; Schofield, 2004) .
Because transfers of freehold land took place outside the manor court, court roll references to such transfers are inconsistent and oblique (Schofield, 2005b: 252, 265-7) . Largely as a result of this, studies of the peasant market in free land are rarer than studies of the customary land market (Campbell, 2005: 24-5) . Moreover, little if anything has been done to investigate the extent to which free land conveyances were bound up with credit. Yet scholars have never had a greater awareness than they do at present of the importance of the freeholding peasantry. Prior to the Black Death, around half of tenant land was held in free tenure, and in terms of tenant numbers there were probably more freeholders than villeins. Furthermore, it has recently been argued that the low 'head rents' with which free holdings were burdened, combined with weak seigniorial control over such holdings, encouraged their repeated subdivision, and contributed to the acute rural congestion and arrested economic development of the period (Campbell, 2005) . Given such arguments, a consideration of the possible links between freehold land transfers and credit transactions, and ways of studying them, is particularly pressing.
Moreover, it is arguable that conveyances of free land are, if anything, more likely than those of customary land to have been driven by the aim of obtaining credit or discharging debts. For example, lack of seigniorial control allowed holders of free land to split up their holdings to an extent that the holders of standard-sized customary landholdings were not permitted by their lords to do, at least in large portions of midland and sourthern England. This meant the freeholders were more likely than the villeins to be able to offer the small parcels most suitable for mortgaging. Also, the most acutely land-poor group in this period almost certainly included a disproportionate number of free tenants, so that we might expect such tenants to have been particuarly likely to try to raise credit on their security of their tiny holdings.
II. Sources for credit and the freehold land market
Several types of source exist which can be used to investigate the land transactions of the freeholders of modest social status, and their possible connections to credit operations. Lawsuits about freehold property came under the jurisdiction of the the royal courts, rather than the manor courts, with the result that the plea rolls of the various king's courts can yield important evidence concerning the context and purpose of disputed land transactions. In quite a few such cases, light is shed on the operation of mortgages and other arrangements associated with the securing of credit (Brand, 2002: 30-1) . Furthermore, from the later twelfth century onwards, the practice of recording the transfer of title to freehold land by means of a fictitious lawsuit heard before the royal justices became common even among persons of peasant status.
Transfers made using this device were written up in documents known as 'feet of fine', many of which have appeared in printed editions. These feet of fine, or fines, have begun to be used to explore the broad progress of the freehold land market in the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (Davies and Kissock, 2004) . However, there also almost certainly exists potential for using this source to look at the specific issue of the connections between land transfers and credit operations, for instance by investigating the extent to which mortgages or other credit-related conditional transfers occur in groups of fines.
However, the most promising source for the issue addressed in this article is probably the charter. Charters in their many different forms of course constitute a fundamental source for most topics of medieval history up to at least the thirteenth century (Bates, 2005) . By the second half of the thirteenth century, it had become routine at village level to use charters to record agreements concerning freehold real estate. In most cases this was a conveyance of a property and its terms. Peasants increasingly created written proof of changes in the title to small pieces of land by means of such charters, attaching their personal seals to the documents for authentification (Harvey and McGuinness, 1996: 77-9) . Clanchy estimated that such peasant charters made in the thirteenth century must have numbered in the hundreds of thousands or even millions (Clanchy, 1993: 50) . Only a minority of these documents survive, yet in spite of losses it is nonetheless likely that charters potentially useful for the study of the land market among peasants exist in their thousands (Harvey, 1996: 405) . This corpus is scattered across a large number of public and private archives and probably the vast majority of such charters remain unpublished.
With some important exceptions, historians have in general not proceeded as far as they might in exploiting the charter material to study the thirteenth century peasant land market, let alone the possible relationships between the land and credit markets.
2 In some measure this reflects the shortcomings of charters and the methodological difficulties involved in using them, some of which are touched on below. However, it is clear that if the circumstances and motivations behind the movement of freehold land are to explored, this cannot be done using court rolls alone. Court rolls shed some light, it is true, on some transfers of the manor's freehold land. This mainly takes the form of the orders that new freehold tenants should come to court to swear fealty to the lord, or to demonstrate 'by what right' they have taken possession of the free holding, which usually means that they must show their charters to the lord. However, if one wishes to know more the about the parties, terms and conditions of the transfers mentioned indirectly in the court roll, or about transfers potentially not mentioned there at all, it is necessary to seek out the relevant original charters where they exist.
III. Charters: character, uses and limitations
Ideally, an investigation at the local level into the free land market and credit relationships would use charters that, as a group, record every transfer of freehold land made between private individuals within a particular village or parish over a finite and known time period. With such a set of charters, the historian would begin with the best possible chance of determining the quantity of land market activity that was credit related, at least with in a specific locality.
Unfortunately, archives of charters matching that ideal are very hard to come by. For one thing, most private charters from before c.1300 are undated, and although with careful analysis an approximate date can be attributed to many, it nonetheless remains difficult to establish the chronological parameters of any study of the type proposed here (Gervers, 2000) . Perhaps more importantly, although charters do characteristically survive in clusters of documents all relating to a single place, the safest assumption must be that such clusters represent only a minority of all the charters ever created for transfers in that location. In order to be able to interpret the information provided by those of a village's charters that do still exist, it is necessary first to reflect upon the reasons for the survival of that minority.
Obviously, charters tend to be preserved where it was in the interests of contemporary individuals or institutions to preserve them. The charters that gave powerful religious establishments and landed families title to the properties that comprised their estates were of course the most likely to be retained, either as originals or in copies in a cartulary (Foulds, 1987) . Groups of thirteenth and fourteenth century charters also remain extant because they served a more specific purpose. To cite one modest example, a small collection of pre-1350 charters pertaining to the village of Cattistock (Dorset) survives in the court of Chancery archive, because they were produced as evidence in a much later lawsuit (TNA C 104/266). In all cases, however, the charters preserved relate only to those properties within a locality in which their preserver held an interest.
It is also necessary to ask how far the surviving minority of private charters is likely to contain records of the small-scale transfers between individuals of broadly peasant status in which this article is interested. Unlike their lords, peasant tenants did not make their own cartularies and were perhaps especially prone to discarding charters when they went out of date (Clanchy, 1993: 50) . In addition if, as was perhaps most usual, the institutions and families that kept charters and cartularies obtained the majority of their properties from persons of relatively high social status, then most clusters of preserved documents relating to specific properties are naturally unlikely to feature many peasant charters. Finally, even where one has isolated a suspected peasant charter, the terse format of the typical private charter provides little in itself whereby one might establish the identity and status of the parties. Therefore, in order to be certain that particular charters are genuinely capable of shedding light on the peasant land market, the ideal course is to use examples which allow one to link the names extracted with those contained in other contemporary sources, the most significant of which are manorial surveys, court rolls, and taxation listings.
What exactly is one looking for when using charters alongside other documents to trace possible associations between the free land market and the credit market? The relevant evidence can be either direct or indirect. The direct evidence comes from charters whose texts themselves make it plain that the property agreement in question was connected to the provision of credit. Such direct evidence would be provided for example, by a classical mortgage of freehold land, which was effected by means of a pair of charters. The first charter of the pair was a standard grant in fee made by borrower to lender. The second, made shortly afterwards, was the 'defeasance', or mortgage proper, which stated that the grant of land made in the first charter would only become permanent on the condition that a stated sum of moneythe loan -was not repaid by a certain date (Barton, 1967; O'Connor, 1993, 52-54) .
Obviously, one should be looking out for documents of this type when sifting any body of charters. Historians have also found other charters whose texts show that the land transfer in question was primarily about credit. For example, Rubin identified a cache of thirteenth century charters in which inhabitants of rural locations leased small areas of land for terms of years to the Hospital of St John the Evangelist in Cambridge, in return for advance payments of rent in a lump sum. It is quite clear that these transactions were actually loans on the security of the leased land (Rubin, 1987: 222-4) . Although the lender in these cases was an institution not an individual, it seems reasonable to attempt to trace further examples of such arrangements in charters that concern private individuals. Indeed, at least one probable example from existing work can be cited, namely a charter of 1242 in which Geoffrey Illing of Castor (Northamptonshire) leased a small quantity of land to the chaplain of Castor for six years in return for 36s (King, 1973: 62) .
A crucial question concerns the likelihood of survival of charters that are explicitly concerned with credit, such as the mortgage and leases just mentioned. Are these special types of charter just as likely to crop up within a corpus of extant charters as are the general run of grants, quitclaims, and so on, which have no obvious credit connection? This important issue is returned to briefly in the conclusion to this paper, after some attempt has been made to trace direct references to credit in two sets of charters.
Evidence for the connection between free land transfer and credit may also be obtained by indirect means, by using information additional to that in the charter in order to infer the context and purpose of the agreement it records. In addition to the leases just mentioned, Rubin also describes numerous charters in which a property was conveyed outright to the Hospital of St John in return for a large sum of money.
The collection of additional information about the vendors in these transactions reveals that they were heavily indebted individuals, often of knightly status, who were clearly disposing of their lands in order to raise sums with which to meet obligations to third parties (Rubin, 1987: 217-21 ). At a lower social level, it ought also to be possible to establish whether peasant sellers of land by charter were doing so in a context of personal indebtedness, primarily by looking for such individuals among the debtors appearing in contemporaneous manorial debt litigation in the locality concerned.
IV. Credit and the transfer of free land: two case studies
Using two separate sets of charters, Section IV makes a preliminary attempt to identify direct and indirect indicators of possible connections between the conveyance of freehold property and the employment of credit.
IV.I. Barton, Cambridgeshire
The village of Barton lies just under five kilometres south-west of the town of Cambridge (Figures 1 and 2 ). In the later thirteenth century, the average size of a tenant landholding there was relatively small, which probably reflects fragmentation of earlier holdings, especially in the freehold sector. The Hundred Rolls survey of 1279-80 covering Barton and the hamlet of Whitwell in the north of the parish shows that of the 93 tenant holdings -49 free and 44 customary -whose area is given, 78 (84 per cent) measured only nine acres (3.64 hectares) or less. The 12 holdings of unspecified acreage comprised five cottages, four messuages, and three half-virgates, the latter each perhaps containing some 15 acres of land. The customary sector actually featured a greater share of sub-ten acre holdings than the free, as all the customary holdings whose area is specified fell into this category. There were 15 free holdings in excess of 10 acres in extent, namely three of 12, seven of 15, three of 16, one of 19, and one of 50 acres. Nonetheless, the small freeholder was far from absent, as there were 19 free holdings of sizes ranging from three acres down to half an acre.
This was also a parish in which lordship was divided: four distinct manors are identifiable in 1279-80. Social structure, as indicated by landholding, was heterogeneous, with several lay lords of relatively modest standing being present, plus at least two holders of sub-manors who, in spite of having their own tenants, must have been indistinguishable from the wealthier direct peasant tenants of the four main Barton manors (Illingworth and Caley, 1812-18: ii, 563-4, Elrington, 1973: 167-8 Barton and Whitwell (KCA BAR/4, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 138 (Elrington, 1973: 164) . As a result, we can confidently expect to find peasant transactions recorded among the 123 private charters. and that Walter had agreed to reclaim it by paying Hugh's debt for him. Walter also paid a further 11 marks to Hugh in order to receive the grant of the recovered land (KCA BAR/11). This was an arrangment that would have been attractive to the unidentified Cambridge Jews, too, since they could not legally be in seisin of Christian lands. These two charters may be added to evidence that has already been identified of early thirteenth century credit ties between Cambridge's Jews and residents of the town's hinterland. However, given the sums and acreages involved, and what is already known about southern Cambridgeshire's Christian debtors, it is likely that the two sellers discussed here were borrowers of relatively high social status (Rubin, 1987, 220; Dobson, 1990-2, 13-14; Mundill, 1998 cases, the lessor had received in advance from the lessee a lump sum as 'rent' in return for making the demise. In the earliest lease this sum was 6s 1d, and in the second and third charters it was 10s and 7s respectively. Only the lease starting in 1222 mentioned an annual rent payable during the term, in this case 1d per annum. It is thus fairly certain that, as in the very similar leases described by Rubin, the lump sums payable at the inception of these leases were cash loans that the lessors received from the lessees in return for land they had pledged as security.
It is also significant that the two leases latest in date specified that the land would revert to the lessors 'without contradiction' at the end of the term. In other words, there does not appear to have been any expectation that the creditor would obtain a permanent interest in the lands demised in the event that the debts were not repaid. Even so, short-term land transfers such as these could still have represented security from the creditor's viewpoint, because if the debtor did not repay, the creditor could recover what was owed to him out of the profits arising from the leased land during the term (Brand, 2002: 30, 39 n.104) . In theory, the creditor could also take the profits of the land in addition to the principal debt, a form of illicit gain that was roundly condemned by contemporary commentators on usury (McLaughlin, 1939: 112-115; Haren, 2000: 164-166 Source: KCA BAR/7, 9-10, 13-15, 18-19, 43, 47, 51-3, 55, 69, 73, 81, 86, 91, 94, 98, 102, 106, 111-12, 115, 122, 128-30, 136. What indirect indicators are there to suggest that the Barton freehold land market was intertwined with networks of credit in the village? Here the evidence is perhaps even scantier than in the case of direct indications of land-credit market connections. It is certainly true that a freehold land sale could yield substantial sums, thereby providing the liquidity to repay outstanding debts. The prices of land revealed by the Barton charters are not as high as some of the scattered examples that have been collected from thirteenth century Norfolk and Suffolk (Campbell, 2005: 52) . Yet the sale prices of Barton land nonetheless appear striking when considered alongside the annual 'head rents' that tenants paid to lords for their holdings.
Thirty-one charters recording grants of land give both the area sold and the 'gersuma', or purchase price paid by buyer to seller. Many of these descriptions of area are in selions, rather than acres. The area covered by one selion apparently varied somewhat. It seems to be the case, however, that one selion did not normally exceed one acre in extent. The 11 charters that use selions thus provide a rough impression of the value of land in Barton, showing that parcels of less than an acre fetched a mean sum of just over 8s 10d (Table 1) .
A more reliable indication of the value of land comes from those charters which specify in acres the area of land sold. The price paid for land ranged massively from 3s up to 35s per acre (Table 1 ). The mean purchase price was just under 13s 6d
per acre, and the median was 12s 8d per acre. This wide price variation presumably reflects differences in the quality of land, and changes in land values across the period c.1200-c.1300. Around 1300, at about the same time as charters began generally to be dated, they also tended to cease recording the gersuma (Harvey, 1996: 406) . Only one dated Barton charter records the gersuma, namely a sale of 1295 in which Walter the Carter of Whitwell sold half an acre of arable for which the buyer paid 11s (KCA BAR/115). A survey of the same year of Barnwell Priory's manor shows that Walter was a free tenant with six acres, for which he paid the priory a total rent of 2s 5d per annum (Clark, 1907: 302) . In other words, the sale of one-twelfth of the holding yielded a sum four and half times greater than a year's rent for the entire holding. If
Walter's dated charter is typical, it shows that the sale of half an acre in the 1290s could raise a sum capable of repaying a debt much larger than the 2s-3s which the available debt litigation evidence suggests was the median for pre-plague money debts (Briggs, 2003: 241 However, no such nominal links between the charters and the manorial debt litigation can be found. This is perhaps not surprising, as debt litigation is relatively rare in the priory's court rolls. In fact, no debt litigation whatsoever appears within the brief records of court proceedings documented in the earlier series of rolls (KCA BAR/262). Those rolls do contain some private litigation of unspecified type which may actually have concerned debt, but none of it features parties named in the charters. In the later of the two series around 10 debt actions appear, but, as already stated, none of them includes parties known from charters to have been buyers or sellers of free land (KCA BAR/261). It is possible that debt cases involving people who also bought or sold land were brought to the court of a manor or manors in Barton other than the priory's. It is known from court rolls surviving from 1356 that at least one of those manors -the estate known as Lancaster manor -held an active fourteenth century court (CCC Archives, XXXVII/1). However, in the absence of relevant earlier court rolls, it is impossible to check fully either the possibility that some of the conveyances detailed in the charters were made with the aim of discharging unpaid debts, or the possibility that they were facilitated by the use of credit.
It is certainly worth pursuing information arising from all extant debt litigation in local manor courts when trying to identify the parties to a particular set of charters, and the circumstances of their transactions. Even court rolls relating to another village altogether, albeit one close by, can shed light on indviduals named in the charters. Wyot's claim to Fraunce's land presumably arose from Fraunce's numerous debts to him, some of which appear still to have been outstanding at Fraunce's death (Briggs , 2002: 137-9) . Was Wyot, from his base in Drayton and then Comberton, in the 1310s and 1320s extending credit to individuals in several nearby villages, including Barton and Whitwell, and buying up or otherwise acquiring the lands of those who could not repay him in the difficult conditions of those decades? We do not know for sure whether those who sold Whitwell land to Wyot had borrowed from him, but it would not be at all surprising if turned out that they had in fact done so.
Overall, then, the Barton charter evidence provides relatively little sign that land transfer was driven by credit arrangements. Only a small minority of the extant charters suggest by their content that the transactions concerned were facilitated by credit, or that they were undertaken to pay off debts or to secure credit. An attempt to approach the issue indirectly by examining court rolls in order to establish the contexts of the charter conveyances has also yielded little, though here the conclusions must necessarily be tentative given the incomplete nature of the information at our disposal. To what extent is the picture from Barton confirmed by a similar examination of a second set of charters?
IV.II. Great Horwood, Buckinghamshire
Great Horwood, located on the heavy clay soils of northern Buckinghamshire, contained three manors in this period. That held by Newton Longville Priory was much the largest. Although tenant landholding in the village was dominated by the standard customary virgates and half-virgates of the priory's manor, some freehold land was present (Illingworth and Caley: ii, 336-7; Page, 1925: 372-4; Page, 1927: 426-7). Nineteen fourteenth century charters of dates up to 1352 survive relating to small parcels of Horwood land (NCA Horwood Charters 18, 22, 27, 28, 33, 39, (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) . It is not entirely clear how these charters came to be in the priory's archive. However, it can be shown that at least five Horwood charters relate to lands that much later came into the lord's possesion, either through purchase or other means. The result of this was that earlier charters pertaining to the holdings were lodged in the seigniorial archive. It is probable that similar reasons lie behind the accumulation and survival of the other charters in the collection. That grant was than followed in June by the mortgage to John.
Thus in crude numerical terms, direct evidence of the connection between land transfer and credit was somewhat greater at Horwood than Barton, since two out of 19
Horwood charters showed such evidence, as opposed to five out of 123 at Barton.
There is also more tangible indirect evidence for Horwood than for Barton to suggest that freehold land transfer was diven by the need to raise or discharge credit, or that such transfer was financed via credit structures. However, that indirect evidence applies to just two or perhaps three of Horwood's small collection of extant charters.
V. Conclusions, and possibilities for further research
The interpenetration of the medieval English peasant land and credit markets is more difficult to study where freehold land is concerned than it is in the case of customary land. However, it is clear that enough appropriate charters survive to make investigation of this subject feasible. Scope certainly exists for greater efforts to seek out this underexploited category of source material. If this is not done, then there is a risk that historians' views of the pre-plague land and credit markets will remain somewhat imbalanced, because they are based disproportionately on the experience of the customary tenants of those larger church estates that generated most of the best preserved series of manorial court rolls.
This preliminary examination of two groups of charters leads to the tentative conclusion that the associations between the transfer of land and the giving and receiving of credit were not as extensive in England between c.1200 and c.1350 as in some other rural settings of pre-industrial Continental Europe. 6 The majority of the charters studied record land transactions that appear to have been made for purposes unconnected with credit. This small-scale study suggests also that documentary traces of the impact of credit upon the free land market are no more numerous than those that indicate credit's impact upon the customary land market. At the same time, some differences have been identified that concern the types of interconnection between land and credit transactions evident in the two sectors. In particular, there is some positive direct evidence among the Barton and Horwood charters that free land was transferred as security for debts. This is in contrast to the customary sector, where virtually no evidence at all for such devices has yet been adduced from court rolls of this period. It should also be stressed that just because the parties to a charter cannot be traced in contemporary manorial debt litigation, this does not constitute absolute proof that the persons involved did not undertake the documented land transaction as a consequence of credit relationships in which they were engaged. It simply means that such credit relationships have not left their mark in the debt litigation proceedings of those law courts whose records happen to survive.
In order to obtain firmer conclusions about the true extent to which land market activity was stimulated by credit networks, and vice-versa, new research must be carried out on several fronts. Most importantly, it is necessary to collect data from greater numbers of private charters with the objective of testing the patterns indentified in the small charter collections studied here. The main aim of such an exercise would be to look for the incidence of those charters that give a direct indication that the transaction recorded was stimulated by credit. As relatively little labour is required to abstract the essentials of a single charter, it might be possible to generate relatively large databases of such material. These could then be used to indicate the importance of mortgages and leases that functioned as security for a loan (or 'security leases') as as a proportion of all charters.
Much care would have to be taken when considering the criteria for selection of charters for inclusion in such a database. One option would be to gather as many charters relating to a particular county or counties as possible. Precedents for such an approach exist, notably the collection of 2,768 Derbyshire charters assembled by Isaac Jeayes on the basis of what was patently a very throrough search of the available archives (Jeayes, 1906 It is also crucial to address the difficult issue of whether mortgages and security leases are rare in charter collections partly because they were less likely to be kept than the ordinary grants, quitclaims, and so forth. One might, for example, imagine that a mortgage deed would be quite readily discarded, once the debt it referred to had been repaid. However, it seems equally possible that the mortgagor/borrower would have been especially keen to retain the terms of the transaction recorded in the mortgage document, perhaps because he or she was fearful of losing title to the mortgaged land in the event of a dispute about the loan repayment. Progress in understanding of such issues might be achieved by studying closely those mortgages and security leases that do survive, in order to determine whether special circumstances are likely to have accompanied their creation or preservation. Indeed, in order to pursue fruitfully the topics considered in this article, 7 Charters involving religious corporations and persons described as 'knight' or 'earl' are excluded.
